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Weiner: Civil Procedure

Civil Procedure
by Stephen A. Weiner*
During the 1966-1967 period under scrutiny, California
appellate courts rendered a multitude of decisions in the field
of civil procedure, the most significant of which are discussed
below by topics.
Forum Non Conveniens
The forum non conveniens doctrine enables a court to
decline to exercise jurisdiction concededly existing, on the
ground that the action should more appropriately be brought
in another forum. The availability of the doctrine in California was initially proclaimed by the California Supreme
Court in a 1954 opinion, Price v. The Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry./ which held that a California court should not
exercise jurisdiction over a Federal Employers' Liability Act
* A.B. 1954, Harvard University;
LL.B 1957, Yale University. Acting
Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. Member, New York
Bar.
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1. 42 Cal.2d 577, 268 P.2d 457, 43
A.L.R.2d 756 (1954) cert. denied 348
U.S. 839, 99 L.ed. 661, 75 S.Ct. 44.

CAL LAW 1967

225

1

Cal Law TrendsCivil
and Developments,
Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 11
Procedure

claim. Plaintiff was a citizen and resident of New Mexico,
defendant was a Kansas corporation doing business in both
New Mexico and California, the accident occurred in New
Mexico, and all witnesses to the accident, and defendant's
medical witnesses, resided in that state. In casting the sole
dissenting vote, Justice Carter lamented: "The holding of the
majority in this case injects into the law of this state for the
first time in its entire judicial history the most monstrous
weapon for obstructing the administration of justice ever conceived by any court or judicial tribunaL,,2
In Thomson v. Continental Ins. CO.,3 decided in 1967, the
California Supreme Court again dealt with the forum non
conveniens doctrine, holding that it "has only an extremely
limited application to a case where . . . the plaintiff is a
bona fide resident of the forum state."4 Plaintiff, a California
resident, owned real property in Houston, Texas, which he
insured with defendants. After the property sustained damage, a dispute developed as to the amount to be paid under
the insurance policies. Plaintiff commenced an action in the
federal district court in Los Angeles. Acting pursuant to
28 U.S.C. section 1404 (a), which authorizes a change of
venue "for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice," defendants obtained a transfer of the
action to the federal district court in Houston. In that court,
plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which defendants answered.
Thereupon, plaintiff filed a new action in the Superior
Court for Los Angeles County, the complaint being substantially identical to that originally filed in federal court. Defendants moved to dismiss, invoking forum non conveniens.
On the basis of defendants' uncontested affidavit, the trial
court granted the motion, noting that , "the [insurance] contract was made in Texas, the insured property is real property
2. 42 Cal.2d at 587, 268 P.2d at 463.
3. 66 Cal.2d 738, 59 Cal. Rptr. 101,
427 P.2d 765 (1967).
4. 66 Cal.2d at 742, 59 Cal. Rptr. at
~~t
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104, 427 P.2d at 768. See also Goodwine v. Superior Court, 63 Cal.2d at
485, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 204, 407 P.2d at
4 (1965).
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in Texas, the alleged damage occurred in Texas, and the
defendants' witnesses are in Texas.,,5
A unanimous supreme court disagreed, in view of the
plaintiff's residency. The court took cognizance of "a state
policy that California residents ought to be able to obtain
redress for grievances in California courts, which are maintained by the state for their benefit."6 While declining to lay
down an absolute rule that forum non conveniens could never
be invoked if plaintiff was a resident, the court indicated
that, in such a case, mere hardship to the defendants was
not a sufficient showing justifying application of the doctrine.
"The instant case does not present
. unusual circumstances. It is a typical suit on a contract-a transitory action."7 Moreover, that the federal action had been transferred to Houston did not mean that the forum non conveniens
contention had previously been decided adversely to plaintiff.
A transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.c. section 1404 "may be ordered
upon a lesser showing of inconvenience than is required to
invoke forum non conveniens."g
In view of the pendency of the Houston action, the court
declared that the trial judge had discretion to grant a stay,
if defendants sought such reliee The court noted, however,
that this question might not arise on remand, since plaintiff
had stated that he would endeavor to have the Houston
action dismissed or stayed pending outcome of the California
suit.
While overwhelmingly supported by precedent, the result
in Thomson has its troublesome aspects. Granted that plaintiff was a resident of the forum state, it seems wastefully
5. 66 Ca1.2d at 741-742, 59 Cal.
Rptr. at 104, 427 P.2d at 768.
6. 66 Cal.2d at 742, 59 Cal. Rptr.
at 104, 427 P.2d at 768.
7. 66 Ca1.2d at 745, 59 Cal. Rptr. at
106, 427 P.2d at 770.
8. 66 Cal.2d at 745, 59 Cal. Rptr. at
106, 427 P.2d at 770. See Norwood v.
Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. at 32, 99 L.ed
at 793, 75 S.Ct. at 546 (1955).
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9. The Thomson court resolved an
"apparent inconsistency" in the California Cases by holding that if an
action is pending in a federal court in
California, the defendant is entitled to
a stay as a matter of right. However,
if the action is pending in a federal
court situated in a foreign jurisdiction,
the granting of a stay is within the
discretion of the trial judge. See 66
Cal.2d 738, 59 Cal. Rptr. 101, 427 P.2d
765 (1967).
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circuitous to permit him to commence a California federal
action, fall victim to a 1404 transfer, and then commence
a California state action which he can prosecute to a conclusion, at least if he succeeds in dismissing the federal action.
It should be noted that a federal suit can be dismissed as of
right if defendant has not yet filed an answer or moved
for summary judgment,10 even though a motion to transfer
to another district has already been granted. l1
However, the Thomson defendants could have avoided
litigating in California if they had promptly removed the
state action to federal court,12 and thereafter obtained a dismissal or stay, or perhaps a second 1404 transfer to Texas
in accordance with the prior ruling. Indeed, in view of the
possibility of removal, and the consequent opportunity for
relief under the liberal provisions of section 1404, the harsh
impact of Thomson can frequently be blunted by a nonresident defendant who is sued by a California resident in a
California state court but desires to litigate in another forum.
Removal will not be available in the rare case where the
defendant, though not a "resident" of California, is deemed
to be a citizen thereof.13 Similarly, removal will be precluded
where the amount in controversy is less than $10,000. A
resident plaintiff anxious to prevent removal and a subsequent
1404 transfer may, in his complaint, claim damages less than
this sum, especially when, under California law, the prayer
for relief will not bar him from obtaining judgment for a
greater amount, assuming defendant does not default. 14 However, this device will probably fail if in reality defendant's
exposure can be shown to be at least $10,000. 15 Finally, no
removal can occur if plaintiff has "properly" joined, together
10. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a).
11. Littman v. Bache & Co., 252
F.2d 479 (2d Cir. [1958]). Since defendants in Thomson had filed an answer in the Houston federal court, the
suit could be dismissed only with court
approval.
12. See 28 U.S.c. §§ 1441, 1446.
13. On the distinction between "residency" and "citizenship," see Southern
228
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R.R. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 95 L.ed.
3, 71 S.Ct. 1 (1950).
14. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 580.
15. See 1A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ~0.158, at 423-24 (2d ed. 1965).
However, a plaintiff might be able to
prevent removal by disclaiming in his
complaint any recovery in excess of
$9,999.00. See id.
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with the nonresident defendant, a citizen of California.16 If
such joinder, however, is deemed fraudulent, it will not succeed in frustrating removaJ.l7 In the wake of the Thomson
holding, we may expect future battles over the effectiveness
of attempts to make state actions nonremovable, when they
are not subject to the forum non conveniens objection but
would be ripe for a 1404 transfer if successfully removed.
Venue
The California scheme for determining venue in transitory
civil actions is an antiquated and complex one, causing particular difficulty when a suit entails multiple causes of action
or is brought against multiple parties. One problem which
has given rise to considerable litigation is the determination
of the proper county for trial when both an individual and
a corporation have been joined as defendants. The California
Constitution (a curious place to find a venue provision)
may be sued in the
declares that "a corporation
county where the contract is made or is to be performed,
or where the obligation or liability arises, or the breach occurs; or in the county where the principal place of business
of such corporation is situated. . . .ms When an individual
and a corporation are both sued, it has been held that even
though venue is proper as to the corporation under the
constitutional provision, it must also be proper as to the
individual were he sued alone. 19 If it is not, the latter may
obtain a transfer of the action to a county where venue would
be proper as to him. To reconcile this result with the constitution, the courts have said that, by joining an individual
16. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), an
action not based on a federal claim
is removable "only if none of the parties
in interest properly joined and served
as defendants is a citizen of the State
in which such action is brought."
Moreover, if the plaintiff is a "citizen"
of California as weII as a "resident,"
joinder of a California citizen as defendant will destroy diversity, and make
the action nonremovable for this reason
as weII. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

17. lA J. MOORE, supra note 15, at
0.161[2]. The John Doe device has
not successfuIIy prevented removal. See
Grigg v. Southern Pac. Co., 246 F.2d
613 (9th Cir. [1957]).
§

18. Cal. Const. art. XII, § 16.
19. E.g., Griffin & Skelly Co. v.
Magnolia & Healdsburg Fruit Cannery
Co., 107 Cal. 378, 40 P. 495 (1895).
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and a corporate defendant, a plaintiff has waived his constitutional right to sue the corporation in any of the designated
counties he chooses. 2o However, if the county where suit
is brought is that where the corporation has its principal
place of business, that is, the county of its residence, then
venue has been held proper despite the presence of an individual defendant. 1 The reasoning is that, in such a case, the
plaintiff has satisfied the general venue provision of the Code
of Civil Procedure that "the county in which the defendants,
or some of them, reside at the commencement of the action
is the proper county for the trial. . . ."2
In State v. Superior Court, 3 plaintiff brought suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, seeking damages for personal injuries resulting from a highway accident in Imperial
County. The State of California and three corporations having their principal places of business in Los Angeles County
were named as defendants. Prior to answering, the state
moved for a change of venue to Imperial County. It relied
upon section 955.2 of the Government Code, providing that
"notwithstanding any other provision of law, where the State
is named as a defendant in any action . . . for . . .
injury to person.
. and the injury.
. occurred
within this State, the proper court for the trial of the action
is a court of competent jurisdiction in the county where the
injury occurred. . . ." Disagreeing with the trial judge's
conclusion that the case was governed by the constitutional
provision on venue in actions against corporations, the Court
of Appeal issued a writ of mandate requiring that the motion
be granted. It reasoned that (1) plaintiff had waived the
advantages of the constitutional provision by joining the state
as a defendant along with the corporations; (2) even though
the action was brought in a county where some of the defendants resided, the provision of the Government Code by its
terms prevailed over the general venue provision of the Code
of Civil Procedure.
20. 107 Cal. 378, 40 P. 495.
1. E.g., McClung v. Watt, 190 Cal.
155, 211 P. 17 (1922).
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2. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 395(1).
3. 252 Cal. App.2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr.
653 (1967).
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While the case highlights the internal inconsistencies in California's venue scheme, the holding seems technically correct,
especially in view of the California precedents that the constitutional provision is waived if plaintiff includes a non-corporate defendant. The case does appear to mark the first
occasion when a California appellate court has held venue
to be improper, despite the fact that a corporation has been
legitimately named as one of the defendants, and the action
is brought in the county of its principal place of business.
In its opinion, the Court of Appeal also stated that the
constitutional provision on venue "is entitled to no greater
priority in the solution of mixed action venue problems than
any applicable statutory provision."4 This approach seems
contrary to the accepted maxim that a constitutional provision
takes precedence over a conflicting statutory provision. Nevertheless, it adds nothing to the results already obtained by
assuming a waiver of the procedural rights conferred by the
Constitution, when a plaintiff joins corporate and non-corporate defendants.
A disturbing aspect of the decision is that plaintiff opposed
the change in venue by asserting that all the doctors whose
testimony she would require were in Los Angeles, and that
she could not afford to transport them to Imperial County.
Under section 396b of the Code of Civil Procedure, a court
in which venue is improperly laid may retain the action, notwithstanding a timely motion for a change of venue, if "the
convenience of the witnesses or the ends of justice will thereby
be promoted." This section should be held applicable to an
action in which the state is a defendant, despite the venue
provision of the Government Code. 5 The court did not reject
this position, but stated that "that portion of plaintiff's opposi4. 252 Cal. App.2d at 695, 60 Cal.
Rptr. at 656-57.
5. Section 955.2 of the Government
Code specifically states that "the court
-- may, on motion, change the place of
the trial in the same manner and under
the same circumstances as the place of
trial may be changed where an action
is between private parties." Although

the legislature did not specifically refer
to the right of a court to order retention of an action despite improper
venue, it seems reasonable to assume
that it did not intend to eliminate this
right when the State is sued in a
county other than that specified in
§ 955.2.
CAL LAW 1967
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tion which related to convenience of plaintiff's witnesses was
premature because the motion was made before an answer
had been filed and the issues framed."6 This result may be
inevitable under section 396b, which appears to grant plaintiff
the right to argue for retention only "if an answer be filed."7
This statutory limitation, however, is most unfortunate.
Section 396b requires that a defendant move for a change
of venue "at the time he answers or demurs." The motion
must be accompanied by an affidavit of merits. Obviously
a crafty defendant seeking such a change will refrain from
answering, and will make his motion in connection with the
filing of some kind of demurrer. The court will then be
powerless to retain the action in the interest of convenience
and justice. It is true that after the action has been transferred, and defendant has answered, plaintiff may still move
in the transferee court, pursuant to section 397, for a retransfer to the original court, in order to promote "the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice."s Yet, in applying this standard, a judge might well be reluctant to return
the case to the very court which has just sent it to his court,
so plaintiff may have less chance of success than if he could
have argued in the original court for retention despite improper venue. If the transferee court is willing to retransfer
the case, it seems an absurd waste of resources to have two
different judges deciding where the action should be tried,
resulting in the original transfer being nullified by a retransfer.
It also seems doubtful whether, in the typical case, defendant's answer will be of much assistance in deciding in what
county the action should conveniently be tried. Far more
informative than the pleadings would be the affidavits of
the opposing parties, dealing specifically with the convenience
6. 252 Cal. App.2d at 691, n. 1, 60
Cal. Rptr. at 654 n. 1.
7. The courts have reasoned that in
determining whether to grant a motion
to change venue on the ground of inconvenience to witnesses, it must be
shown that the testimony of the allegedly inconvenienced witness is material; and whether a witness' testimony
232
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is material can only be determined when
the issues are framed; hence, the requirement that an answer be filed. See
Johnson v. Superior Court, 232 Cal.
App.2d at 214, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 657
(1965), and cases there cited.
8. See 1 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Actions, § 266, at 788 (1954).
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issue. In any event, under the existing statutory scheme, a
defendant must file an affidavit of merits when the change of
venue is sought and also will have filed an answer, except in
those cases where he has chosen to demur.
Assuming the legislature removes the strategic advantage
conferred by demurring rather than answering, one may anticipate an increase in the relative number of cases where defendant's answer is in fact filed in conjunction with his motion
for a transfer. Thus the supposed advantage flowing from
the availability of the answer will in fact be realized.
Substitution of Correct for Incorrect Defendant
An increasingly common phenomenom of modern business
is the use of a number of distinct legal entities to carryon an
integrated operation. For example, the typical publicly held
company is itself the owner of a host of subsidiary corporations, which often have names confusingly similar to that of
the parent. Frequently a plaintiff, confused by this similarity
in the designation of related entities, names the wrong one
as a defendant, and fails to discover his error until after
the statute of limitations has run. If he has in fact served
the right defendant, but simply called it by the wrong name,
the problem is a relatively simple one of misnomer; an amendment of the complaint to correct the name is generally permitted, whether or not the statute has run. But if service
has been made only on the erroneously selected defendant
named in the complaint, the courts traditionally have refused
to permit the maintenance of the action against the correct
defendant, on the ground that plaintiff, once the statute has
run, cannot bring in a new party to the action. 9 Nor has it
mattered that the correct defendant, because of his relationship to the wrong defendant, in fact had prior knowledge of
the commencement of the action and of plaintiff's error.
In Mayberry v. Coca Cola Bottling Company/a the Court
of Appeal took a more novel approach to the problem. Plaintiff sought damages for drinking a bottle of contaminated
9. See generally, 1 CHADBOURN,
GROSSMAN & VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA PLEADING §§ 686-88 (1961).

10. 244 Cal. App.2d 350, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 317 (1966).
CAL LAW 1967
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Coca Cola. The beverage had been bottled by Coca Cola
Bottling Company of Sacramento, which was a partnership.
Another entity, Coca Cola Bottling Company of Sacramento,
Ltd., was a corporation which supplied syrup to the partnership, but did no bottling. The three persons comprising the
partnership were also officers or directors of the corporation.
Both entities were housed on the same premises. Plaintiff
mistakenly named as defendant the corporation rather than
the partnership. A fictitious defendant, designated as Black
& White Company, was also named. Process was served on
the general manager of the corporation, who was also assistant general manager of the partnership, although not a partner. Thus service of process was never made on the partnership as such, since no partner was served. l l
The corporation appeared in the action, and began litigating as though it were the correct defendant. It filed an answer,
consisting of a general denial and an affirmative defense of
contributory negligence. It took plaintiff's deposition. It
filed a pretrial statement purporting to list the issues for decision, which made no mention of plaintiff's mistaken identification of the defendant. The pretrial order adopted defendant's statement of the issues, and dismissed the fictitious
defendant. By the time the case went to trial, the one-year
statute of limitations had already run. At the trial, defendant introduced testimony of the sales manager of the partnership, thereby disclosing for the first time the pitfall into which
plaintiff had fallen. A motion to substitute the partnership
for the corporation was granted, as was a motion for a nonsuit
in favor of the corporation, thereby terminating the trial.
Subsequently the partnership demurred to the complaint, on
11. See 244 Cal. App.2d at 353, 53
Cal. Rptr. at 320. Prior to its recent
amendment, Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 388
indicated that service on a partnership
was made by serving at least one of
the partners. See 1 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Actions, § 299, at 820
(1954). In 1967 the legislature amended
§ 388 and added § 411.2.1, with the result that, if a partnership has designated
234
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an agent for the service of process as
provided in newly enacted Cal. Corp.
Code § 24003, service shaH be made on
such agent. If no such person has been
designated, or the designated person
cannot be found at his specified address,
then service shaH be made on a partner,
and by mailing a copy of the summons
to the partnership at its last known
mailing address.
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the ground of the statute of limitations. The demurrer was
sustained without leave to amend, and a judgment of dismissal
followed.
Distressed by the tactics of the corporate defendant, and
impressed by the equities in plaintiff's favor, Justice Leonard
Friedman found error in denying an opportunity to amend the
complaint so as to allege why the statute of limitations should
be deemed tolled. Writing for the court, he listed the factors
which suggested that relief should be granted: the excusable
nature of plaintiff's mistake in view of the striking similarity
in the names of the entities, "the substantial identity of the
persons involved in both firms,»l2 the obvious awareness of the
real defendant that litigation had been commenced, the steps
taken by the corporate defendant to perpetuate plaintiff's error
beyond the point of repair. He also noted that, had plaintiff
learned of his error before the fictitious defendant had unsuspectingly been dismissed, the partnership could have been
substituted for the fictitious defendant, and would not have
been able to invoke the bar of the statute of limitations.
Although the court did not say so, presumably the acts of the
corporation could fairly be imputed to the partnership because of the close relationship between the entities, and the
similarity in their real principals.
While the court purported to find authority for its liberal
position in prior California cases, the decision goes significantly beyond such cases. For in the precedents cited,13 the
service of process which was made was sufficient to obtain
jurisdiction over the business entity intended to be sued, even
though that entity was incorrectly named or described. Thus
the cases could be deemed to present instances of mere misnomer, and not an attempted addition of a new party after
the statute of limitations had run. In the instant case, as
no member of the partnership was ever served with process,
the misnomer rationale was not available.
Nevertheless, the court reached a most commendable result.
Indeed, even disregarding the manner in which the corporate
12. 244 Cal. App.2d at 354, 53 Cal.
Rptr. at 320.
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13. See 244 Cal. App.2d at 353, 53
Cal. Rptr. at 320.
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defendant misled the plaintiff, the holding seems sound. When
a plaintiff has reasonably, but erroneously, sued the wrong
affiliate of an integrally related enterprise, and the right
affiliate knows or should know that the suit has been brought
and that an obvious mistake has been made in designating
the defendant, it seems unduly harsh to deprive a plaintiff
of his day in court if the mistake is not discovered in time
to bring a second action. Conceptually, such a case could
be handled by the admittedly strained rationale that, under
these circumstances, the incorrect defendant should be said
to have received service of process as agent for the correct
one. Alternatively, the suggestion in Mayberry could be followed that the statute of limitations is declared tolled to
prevent injustice, a result that courts have reached in other
instances where the bite of the statute is deemed too severe. a
Where the incorrect defendant has pretended, at the pleading and pretrial stage, to be the correct defendant, so that
plaintiff loses his opportunity to take appropriate remedial
action, an additional rationale is possible, namely, that the
incorrect defendant is estopped to raise the identity question.
Accordingly, the suit would proceed against it, and it would
be liable for any judgment rendered on the basis of the conduct of its affiliate. This question was not before the court
in Mayberry, since plaintiff had apparently not objected to the
dismissal of the corporate defendant, once the error had
emerged. However, the court hinted it would not be unsympathetic to such an estoppel approach.I5
In LeMire v. Querilo/ 6 a case that came before it shortly
after Mayberry, the same Court of Appeal did in fact apply
the estoppel theory for which it had laid the groundwork in
its prior opinion. Plaintiff brought a negligence action against
a person in his individual capacity, alleging that the individual
was the owner of a truck involved in an accident. In his
answer, his conduct of pretrial discovery, and his pretrial
statement, defendant gave no clue that the suit had been
14. See, e.g., Developments in the
Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV.
L. REV 1177, 1220-24 (1950).

236
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15. See 244 Cal. App.2d at 352 n. 1,
53 Cal. Rptr. at 319 n. 1.
16. 250 Cal. App.2d 799, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 804 (1967).
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brought against the wrong entity. At the trial, however, he
sought to raise the defense that the owner of the truck was
a family corporation. The court had no difficulty in concluding that the individual was estopped to assert corporate ownership of the vehicle in question. The decision was made easier
by the conflict in the evidence whether the alleged corporate
owner was in fact a bona fide entity.
Mayberry and LeMire may herald a general willingness
by California courts to adopt the estoppel solution in cases
of this kind, at least where defendant's pretrial statement,
which is supposed to specify the "contentions to be made as
to the issues remaining in dispute,,,17 is silent as to the identity
question. Under these circumstances, the pretrial conference
order will also omit reference to this question, and since,
where inconsistent with the pleadings, it "controls the subsequent course of the case unless modified
to prevent
manifest injustice,"18 a simple waiver theory would also seem
applicable. 19
Cross-complaints and Counterclaims

When a party wishes to assert a claim against one who has
sued him, he is confronted by the bewildering distinction, to
which California has tenaciously clung, between a crosscomplaint and a counterclaim. By a cross-complaint, a litigant seeks affirmative relief against any person, whether or
not a party to the original action, relating to the transaction
upon which the action is brought. 20 By a counterclaim, a
17. Cal. Ct. Rule 210(c).
18. Cal. Ct. Rule 216. It should be
noted that, in view of the 1967 amendment to Cal. Ct. Rule 208, pretrial conferences will be far less common than
in the past, since they are now to be
held only when requested by a party or
specifically ordered by the court.
19. Stephens v. Berry, 249 Cal. App.
2d 474, 57 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1967), is a
third case presenting the question of suit
against the wrong defendant. Plaintiff
mistakenly named the driver of the car

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967

into which his car had been pushed,
rather than the driver of the car which
had struck plaintiff's car from the rear.
The court held that the correct defendant could not be substituted for the incorrect one after the statute of limitations had run. The ruling seems sound,
since, in contrast to Mayberry and LeMire, there was no business connection
between the correct and incorrect defendants; indeed, there was no reason
to think they even knew each other.
20. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 442.
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litigant asserts a claim which "must tend to diminish or
defeat the plaintiff's recovery"/ that is, he seeks a money
recovery in an action in which a money recovery is sought
of him.2 A counterclaim "must exist in favor of a defendant
and against a plaintiff between whom a several judgment
might be had in the action."3
A claim for affirmative relief will frequently qualify as
both a cross-complaint and a counterclaim, in that a claim
tending to diminish or defeat a plaintiff's recovery will arise
"out of the transaction set forth in the complaint." Under
these circumstances-and no other-the claim will be deemed
a compulsory counterclaim, and the litigant will be barred
from maintaining a subsequent action thereon. 4
In Carey v. Cusack,5 the Court of Appeal wrestled with
some problems posed by the foregoing modes of classification.
The Cusacks had entered into an agreement with Carey and
Kennan, real estate brokers, for the subdivision into lots, improvement, and sale to the public of a parcel of land which
the Cusacks owned. The brokers retained an engineer to
assist in the project, but after substantial work had been completed by both the brokers and the engineer, the property
was sold intact by the Cusacks, through another broker, to a
college. The engineer sued the Cusacks to recover for services
rendered. The Cusacks in turn filed a cross-complaint against
the brokers, in which the first cause of action sought a declaratory judgment that the brokers were liable for the engineer's
services. The second cause of action sought "subrogation"
against the brokers in the event the Cusacks were required
to pay the engineer. The court held the Cusacks liable to
the engineer, and ruled that the brokers were not liable.
About two months after the entry of judgment in this
action, the brokers sued the Cusacks to recover for services
1. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 438.
2. See 2 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Pleading, § 580 (1954).
3. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 438. An
answer is required to a cross-complaint
which is deemed a separate pleading,
but not to a counterclaim, which is con238
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sidered part of the defendant's answer.
See id. §§ 422, 437.
4. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 439.
5. 245 Cal. App.2d 57, 54 Cal. Rptr.
244 (1966), hearing denied, 65 A. C.
No. 16, Minutes 2 (Nov. 25, 1966l.
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rendered. The Cusacks argued that the brokers should have
pleaded this claim as a counterclaim in their answer to the
former cross-complaint, and that they were now barred from
asserting it. The Court of Appeal rejected the argument on
three different grounds. It first suggested that, in view of the
statutory definition, a "counterclaim" could be asserted only
"against a plaintiff
and may not be used to bring
in third parties or seek relief against a codefendant."6 The
court was unsympathetic to the argument that the words
"plaintiff," "defendant" and "complaint" in the statutes pertaining to counterclaims should be read to include "crosscomplainant," "cross-defendant" and "cross-complaint" respectively. Accordingly, even assuming the brokers could
have asserted a "cross-complaint" to the Cusacks' crosscomplaint, they would not be prohibited from bringing a
separate action, since a claim must qualify as both a "counterclaim" and a "cross-complaint" to be compulsory.
The court gave another reason why the brokers' claim could
not have been asserted as a "counterclaim" to the crosscomplaint:
It does not tend to defeat or diminish the recovery
sought by the Cusacks against the brokers.
[T]here were no monetary claims made by the Cusacks
against the brokers. In one cause of action, the Cusacks'
cross-complaint merely asked for a declaratory judgment
holding . . . the brokers liable for Nolte's [the engineer's] services. In their other causes of action based on
the right of subrogation, the Cusacks could have made
no direct monetary recovery from the brokers unless and
until they first paid Nolte the amount owed. . . . They
were not demanding a monetary damage award but
were, in effect, simply asking the court to declare that
someone else was liable for Nolte's services. 7
Even assuming the brokers' claim could be brought within
the statutory definition of a counterclaim, the court held that
it would still not be compulsory, because it did not arise out
6. 245 Cal. App.2d at 64, 54 Cal.
Rptr. at 249.

7. 245 Cal. App.2d at 67, 54 Cal.
Rptr. at 250-51.
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of the transaction set forth in the cross-complaint. The court
noted that "the term 'transaction' is not limited to a single,
isolated act or occurrence, but may embrace a series of acts
or occurrences logically interrelated."g However, it held that
the dealings between the brokers and the engineer, which led
to the latter's employment, and the agreement between the
Cusacks and the brokers "were based on two separate and
distinct transactions, and are devoid of any logical interrelation."a

The decision vividly illustrates the urgent need for statutory
revision in this area of California procedural law. The first
point to be noted is that, under the court's reasoning, the
brokers would not have been permitted to assert their claim
against the Cusacks in the prior action, even had they so desired. Their claim would not qualify as a "counterclaim."
Nor would it qualify as a "cross-complaint," since it was held
to be based on a different transaction than the complaint
and the Cusacks' cross-complaint, and "devoid of any logical
interrelation" with such claims of other parties.
Even assuming that assertion of the brokers' claim should
not have been required, prohibiting its assertion, and compelling a separate action, is clearly unsound. Faced with the
Cusacks' claim that the obligation to pay the engineer was
on them, surely the brokers should have been allowed to
counterattack in the same action, by seeking payment from
the Cusacks for services performed on the very business deal
for which the engineer was retained. Since the brokers sought
a recovery in quantum meruit/ o they could have argued, had
they alone been held liable for paying the engineer, that reimbursement of this cost should be one of the elements in
fixing the amount of their own recovery. Even if the brokers
were held obligated to indemnify the Cusacks for the latters'
payment to the engineer, were they entitled to a larger payment from the Cusacks for their own services, the court
8. 245 Cal. App.2d at 66, 54 Cal.
Rptr. at 250.
9. 245 Cal. App.2d at 66, 54 Cal.
Rptr. at 520.
10. While they had a contract with
240
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the Cusacks, it did not state what compensation, if any, would be due to the
brokers if the transaction did not proceed to the sale of improved subdivided
lots.
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would have entered judgment for the excess in favor of the
brokers. l1 The brokers should not be compelled to assume
the risk of a net loss by virtue of the Cusacks' bankruptcy
following a judgment requiring the brokers to indemnify the
Cusacks.
Moreover, if the Cusacks had not filed a cross-complaint
against the brokers, but had brought a separate action against
them seeking reimbursement after the Cusacks had paid a
judgment in favor of the engineer, the brokers clearly would
have been permitted to counterclaim. It is difficult to see
why they should be placed at a disadvantage simply because
they happen to be brought into an action originally commenced by a third party.
There are also strong policy arguments why the assertion
of the brokers' claim in the prior action should have been
mandatory. The claim for services of both the engineer and
the brokers related to the same general business deal. So did
the dispute between the Cusacks and the brokers over responsibility to the engineer. It is reasonable to assume that resolution of the controversies about the engineer's fee would entail
introduction of much of the same evidence as would be presented in connection with the brokers' claim. Background
information, the relationship among the parties, the negotiations held-these and other matters were common to all the
points at issue. Thus duplication, and the consequent waste
of public and private resources, would be avoided by a single
trial. Moreover, as already noted, the amount of the brokers'
recovery was potentially intertwined with the disposition of
the engineer's claim. In view of these factors, the court
seems to have given an unduly narrow interpretation to the
term "transaction."
The California scheme for categorizing claims against an
opposing party is nonsensical in the modern world,12 and
should be replaced by the relevant provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. In federal court, a pleading may
11. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 666.
12. The distinctions presently embraced by California have hoary his16
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state as a counterclaim any claim against any opposing party,
whether or not it diminishes or defeats the recovery sought
by such party, and even if it claims relief exceeding in amount,
or different in kind, from that sought in the pleading of the
opposing party.I3 The counterclaim is normally compulsory
"if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
."14
There
subject matter of the opposing party's claim.
is no such concept as a cross-complaint, all claims against an
opposing party being labeled counterclaims. A party in
the position of the brokers, who has been impleaded so that
defendant may enforce his claim for indemnification if held
liable to plaintiff, is expressly authorized to assert counterclaims against the one bringing him into the action. I5
Thus, the federal scheme avoids the artificial restrictions
on the maintenance of claims against opposing parties which
are embedded in the California statutes, relying upon the
power to grant separate trials to counteract any difficulties
caused by unlimited permissive assertion. I6 Moreover,
whether a counterclaim arises out of the transaction that is
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim, and is thus
compulsory, hinges upon the duplication in the presentation
of evidence which would result from separate trials. I7
Discovery
Under the present California statutory scheme, a party
who desires to obtain discovery of documents in the posses13. Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 (b), (c).
14. Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a). If a
counterclaim is not compulsory, it must
be supported by an independent basis of
federal jurisdiction to entitle the counterclaimant to affirmative relief. 3 J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 13.19[1]
(2d ed. 1967). It can be used defensively as a set-off without such jurisdictional grounds.
15. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
16. A separate trial of a claim and
counterclaim may be ordered "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid
242
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prejudice, or when separate trials will
be conducive to expedition and economy. . . . " Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b); see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 (i). A California
court presently has this power. Cal.
Code Civ. Pro. § 438.
17. "[A] counterclaim is compulsory
if it bears a 'logical relationship' to an
opposing party's claim," that is, "where
separate trials on each of their respective claims would involve a substantial
duplication of effort and time by the
parties and the courts." Great Lakes
Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co.,
286 F.2d at 634 (3d Cir. [1960]).
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sion of an adverse party may proceed by two alternative
routes. Pursuant to section 2031 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he may move, upon notice, for an order requiring the
production of such documents. He is required to show "good
cause," that is, "specific facts justifying discovery, and mere
proof of the relevance of the information sought to the subject matter of the action shall not be sufficient.»lS A second
possibility is to serve a subpoena duces tecum on the adverse
party, pursuant to section 1985 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
To obtain the issuance of such a subpoena, the applicant
must submit an affidavit showing "good cause" and setting
forth "the materiality" of the documents "to the issues involved in the case."
In Associated Brewers Distributing Company v. Superior
Court,19 the question arose whether the difference in statutory
language compelled that different standards govern discovery
under the two sections. Plaintiff sued to recover the purchase
price of goods. Defendant counterclaimed, alleging that
plaintiff had terminated a distribution agreement without
cause. Acting pursuant to section 2031, defendant sought
production of documents in plaintiff's possession relating to
defendant's carrying out, or failing to carry out, plaintiff's
distribution recommendations. The trial court denied the
motion, but the California Supreme Court disagreed. Speaking for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Traynor held that a
party, proceeding under section 2031, is not required to show
that the documents sought are admissible in evidence. This
ruling is clearly correct. Section 2031, which derives from
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides
that the court may order the production of documents "which
constitute or contain evidence relating to any of the matters
within the scope of the examination permitted by" section
2016 (b). That section deals with depositions, and authorizes
examination regarding any unprivileged matter "relevant to
the subject matter" of the action. It further states that "it
is not ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably
18. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 2036.

19. 65 Cal.2d 583, 55 Cal. Rptr. 772,
422 P.2d 332 (1967).
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calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
Moreover, the major goal of pre-trial discovery-"to prevent
surprise at trial and to allow proper preparation"2°-would
be frustrated if documents in an adversary's possession could
be withheld unless admissible in evidence.
Noting that the determination of the "good cause" question "necessarily depends upon the facts and issues of the
particular case,"l the court held that this defendant had established its right to production, since the documents might disclose that the distributorship had been terminated without
cause, might reveal admissions that alleged deficiencies of
defendant had been corrected, and might contain evidence
that could be used to impeach plaintiff's witnesses at trial.
Plaintiff did not contend that the documents would not aid
defendant's case, nor had it made any showing that the request for inspection was made in bad faith.
Plaintiff argued that the standards for obtaining documents
should be the same whether a party has proceeded under
section 2031 or under section 1985, and that, accordingly,
the more restrictive "materiality to the issues" requirement of
section 1985 should be engrafted onto section 2031. The
court, however, took the following position:
Although it has been held that relevancy to the subject
matter is a broader concept than materiality to the
it is unnecessary to determine the disissues
tinction between these standards in this case. [Plaintiff]
has met them both. When the "subpoena power is invoked to secure discovery, the good cause and materiality requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1985
must be governed by discovery standards." . . . Accordingly, whether discovery is sought by motion under
section 2031 or by subpoena under section 1985, it is
not necessary to show that the material sought will be
admissible in evidence.
20. 65 CaI.2d at 588, 55 Cal. Rptr.
at 755, 422 P.2d at 335.
244
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1. 65 CaI.2d at 587, 55 Cal. Rptr. at
774, 422 P.2d at 334.
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The documents sought are thus relevant to
the subject matter and material to the issues.
2
While not entirely clear, this language may be reasonably
construed to say that if a party seeks discovery by subpoena
under section 1985, he need only meet the tests which would
be applicable to obtain discovery under section 2031. Thus,
so far as discovery from a party is concerned, the court seems
to have harmonized the statutory scheme by providing that
the same standard shall control both sections. If this interpretation is correct, the court has implicitly overruled a
1965 decision of a District Court of Appeal, holding that,
even in the discovery context, the legislature intended "not
to equate 'materiality to the issues' in section 1985 with 'relevancy to the subject matter' in sections 2016, subdivision (b)
and 2031."3
The distinction remains under Associated Brewers that if a
party proceeds under section 2031, he can obtain a court order
only after his opponent has had an opportunity to be heard,
whereas if he proceeds under section 1985, he can obtain the
issuance of a subpoena ex parte. Nevertheless, since the
opponent can move to quash the subpoena,4 this difference
does not seem very significant. It is doubtful whether utilizing
section 1985 will result in a shifting of the burden of proof
if the right to obtain production is challenged. 5
2. 65 Cal.2d at 587-88, 55 Cal. Rptr.
at 775, 422 P.2d at 335.
3. Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court, 234 Cal. App.2d at 78789, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 90-91 (1965). But
see Filipoff v. Superior Court, 56 Cal.
2d 443, 15 Cal. Rptr. 139, 364 P.2d
315 (1961).
4. See Flora Crane Service, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 234 Cal. App.2d 767,
45 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1965).
5. If a party refuses to respond to a
subpoena duces tecum utilized for discovery purposes, his adversary's sole
remedy appears to be to apply to the
court for an order compelling production, which is obtainable only "if good
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cause is shown." Cal. Code Civ. Pro.
2034(a). The court may order the
payment of reasonable expenses if it
"finds that the refusal was without substantial justification. . . ." [d. Presumably, the party seeking discovery
would still have the burden of proof
on good cause. This burden would
undoubtedly be held to remain with
the party seeking discovery, even if a
motion to quash has been made by the
party served with the subpoena. Thus,
in Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 234 Cal. App.2d at 791, 45 Cal.
Rptr. at 93 (1965), where there was
such a motion to quash, the court still
stated that "the burden of showing good
cause for the inspection or production
CAL LAW 1967
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Actually, a more sensible statutory scheme than either of
the present alternatives would be to provide that a party can
obtain the production of documents simply by serving an
appropriate notice on an adverse party, and that the opponent
may move to quash if he thinks the demand improper. 6 Since,
in many cases, documents will be voluntarily furnished upon
formal demand, it seems wasteful to require court action in
every case. The recommended procedure would be similar
to that employed with respect to depositions, a party being
permitted to serve a notice to take his adversary's deposition
without any authorizing court order or subpoena.' Wilful
noncompliance with a notice to produce could then be treated
the same way as the Code of Civil Procedure presently handles
wilful noncompliance with a notice to appear for a deposition. s
Associated Brewers is particularly significant as it may relate to discovery of documents in the possession of witnesses.
Under these circumstances a party must use section 1985 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, as section 2031 by its terms is
applicable only to discovery of documents held by parties.
Presumably, under the court's decision, the standard that
governs production of documents of parties under section
2031 would also govern production of documents of witnesses under section 1985. 9 This result seems a sound one,
in view of the aims of pretrial discovery. Also, the statute
does not differentiate between parties and witnesses with respect to the scope of deposition upon oral examination. 10 It
may be contended that producing documents is more burdensome for a witness than answering questions propounded
orally; but this mayor may not be the case, and the distinction should yield to a liberal attitude toward discovery.
of documentary evidence is on the party
seeking discovery."
6. This scheme is presently in effect
in New York. See N.Y. Civ. Prac.
§§ 3120, 3122.
7. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 2016(a),
2019(a)(4); see also § 2019(b)(1).
8. Cal. Code Civ. Pro.

§

2034(d).

9. This appears to be the interpre246
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tation given to Associated Brewers in
Kenney v. Superior Court, 255 Cal.
App.2d 126 at 129, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 8788 (1967). There the court upheld production from a third party under
§ 1985, because the documents sought
might be of assistance in the effective
preparation for trial.
10. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 2016(a),
(b).
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If section 1985 is used to obtain issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum in connection with a trial, the courts can be
expected to be less liberal than if pre-trial discovery is the
objective. Accordingly, the phrase "materiality to the issues"
will receive a liberal or strict interpretation, depending upon
the purpose for which the subpoena is sought. While it may
seem strange that a single standard should be subject to this
dual construction, the end result is a sensible one. l l

Additur
As the swelling volume of personal injury litigation continues to overwhelm our courts, commentators have proposed
remedial action ranging from abolition of trial by jury to
substitution of a state administered compensation scheme
which eliminates fault as a basis of private liability in automobile accident cases. Adoption in the near future of such
far-reaching proposals seems unlikely, so less drastic ways of
affording partial relief remain of major interest. Additur is
a technique which may eliminate the need for a costly retrial, when a jury verdict awarding damages for personal injury is deemed by the trial judge to be inadequate. Pursuant
to this technique, the trial judge grants a retrial (which may
be limited solely to the damage issue) unless the defendant
consents that the damage award be increased to a specified
sum. A defendant will presumably accept the condition if
he fears that a second jury will award an even larger sum
than the judge has selected. The counterpart of additur is
remittitur, pursuant to which a judge who believes a damage
award to be excessive grants a retrial unless the plaintiff
agrees that the award may be reduced to a specified sum.
11. Another discovery case of note
decided during the period under scrutiny
is Whitfield v. Superior Court, 246 Cal.
App.2d 81, 54 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1966).
Plaintiff's personal injury suit placed in
issue her mental condition, as she allegedly was under the care of a psychiatrist for the trauma occasioned by
the accident. The court upheld an
order entered under Cal. Code Civ. Pro.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967

§ 2032(a), permitting defendant's psychiatrist to examine plaintiff without
the presence of her attorney or a reporter. The court noted that the nature of the examination was such that,
to be effective, the patient must not
be distracted by the presence of other
persons, or be inhibited by the knowledge that her statements are being recorded verbatim.
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While remittitur has been a frequently used device in both
federal and state courts, Dimick v. Schiedt,I2 a 1935 decision
of the United States Supreme Court, held the additur technique to be an unconstitutional denial of plaintiff's federal
right of trial by jury. The Court concluded that the practice
was not recognized by the English common law at the time
that the seventh amendment was adopted,13 and that accordingly a plaintiff had a right to a second jury trial if the verdict
of the first jury was inadequate. The Court acknowledged
that its reasoning cast doubt on the constitutionality of remittitur, but held that that technique was so well established
it should not now be vitiated. Four powerful dissenting
voices-those of Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Stone,
Brandeis, and Cardozo-saw no constitutional impediment
to the use of additur.
In a 1952 decision, Dorsey v. Barba,I4 the California
Supreme Court relied upon Dimick to find that additur was
a denial of the state constitutional right to a jury trial. Justice
Traynor vehemently dissented, but was unable to persuade
any of his colleagues.
Fifteen years later, in Jehl v. Southern Pacific Company/5
the California Supreme Court again considered the constitutionality of additur, and the result was a personal triumph
for Chief Justice Traynor, the sole surviving member of the
1952 bench. Writing for a unanimous court, he overruled
Dorsey, "finding its arguments unpersuasive when considered
in the light of the demands of fair and efficient administration
of justice."16 Supplementing such practical considerations was
the court's disclosure of a flaw in the reasoning of Dimick,
upon which Dorsey had hinged. True, additur was not recognized by the English common law in the late eighteenth cen12. 293 u.s. 474, 79 L.ed. 603, 55
S.Ct. 296, 95 A.L.R. 1150 (1935).
13. "In order to ascertain the scope
and meaning of the Seventh Amendment [preserving the right of trial by
jury], resort must be had to the appropriate rules of the common law established at the time of the adoption of
that constitutional provision in 1791."
248
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293 U.S. at 476, 79 L.ed. at 606, 55 S.
Ct. at 296, 95 A.L.R. at 1152.

14. 38 Ca1.2d 350, 240 P.2d 604
(1952).
15. 66 Ca1.2d 821, 59 Cal. Rptr. 276,
427 P.2d 988 (1967).
16. 66 Ca1.2d at 828, 59 Cal. Rptr.
at 280, 427 P.2d at 992.
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tury, but the question of its use was never squarely presented,
the reason being that, until the middle of the nineteenth century, the English courts had refused to grant new trials on the
ground of an inadequate damage award by the jury. Thus
the modern practice of allowing plaintiff a second trial in
such a case was itself "a limitation on the former broad
powers of the jury.,,17 In any event, a plaintiff can hardly
complain that additur violates his right of trial by jury, since
the English common law as of the controlling date would have
compelled him to accept the very jury award which the judge
using additur is increasing for his benefit. 18
It is difficult to quarrel with either the reasoning of Jehl or
the result. Indeed, Chief Justice Traynor demolishes Dimick
so effectively that it seems doubtful that decision will survive,
if the United States Supreme Court ever has another opportunity to consider the additur question. At least California
trial judges, dissatisfied with the amount of damages awarded
by a jury, now have in their arsenal both remittitur and
additur as possible means of avoiding a second round of jury
litigation. 19
An interesting facet of Jehl is its suggestion that the practice
of granting a new trial on the ground of an inadequate damage
award may well be in technical derogation of the constitutional
right to jury trial of the defendant, since the English common
law would have treated the verdict as conclusive. The question remains whether the court, having recognized the extent
17. 66 Cal.2d at 830, 59 Cal. Rptr.
at 282, 427 P.2d at 994. See Comment,
Additur-Procedural Boon or Constitutional Calamity?, 17 DE PAUL L. REV.
175, 179-80 (1967), and authorities
there cited.
18. The court also held the additur
technique permissible in a Federal Employers' Liability Act action brought in
a California state court, on the ground
that the state constitutional provision,
and not the seventh amendment, was
applicable to such an action.
19. In 1967 the California legislature enacted Cal. Code Civ. Pro.
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§ 662.5, expressly authorizing use of
additur: (a) "where the verdict of the
jury on the issue of damages is supported by substantial evidence but an
order granting a new trial limited to the
issue of damages would nevertheless be
proper," and (b) "in any other case
where . . . constitutionally permissible." In Jehl, the Court specifically noted that, "since we overrule
Dorsey, it is unnecessary to limit additur
to those cases where the jury's verdict
is supported by substantial evidence."
66 CaJ.2d at 832 n. 15, 59 Cal. Rptr.
at 283 n. 15, 427 P.2d at 995 n. 15.
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of previous inroads on the constitutional mandate, would be
willing to go so far as to uphold a judge's (as opposed to a
second jury's) increasing an inadequate damage award without the defendant's consent. While it seems most doubtful
that such a procedure would be deemed permissible, Jehl may
herald a liberal attitude toward permitting experimentation
with administratively useful techniques, notwithstanding a
claimed impairment of the right to jury trial.
Collateral Estoppel
In Louie Queriolo Trucking, Inc. v. Superior Court,20 plaintiff sought recovery for $16,000 of property damage caused
when a vehicle owned by it, and driven by one of its employees,
fell into an excavation which defendant construction company
had made in a highway. Plaintiff claimed that defendant was
barred from denying liability by the outcome of a prior negligence suit brought against defendant by the employee of
plaintiff, who sought recovery for personal injuries incurred
in the same accident. In that suit a jury, sitting at the liability portion of a bifurcated trial, decided that issue against
defendant, after which defendant's motion for a new trial was
denied, and an appeal filed. The case was subsequently
settled and the appeal dismissed.
The Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiff that the liability issue was no longer open in the second suit. Two appellate judges thought that the question presented could be
easily disposed of on the basis of precedents holding that "a
judgment in favor of an employee in an automobile casualty
case, or other similar action based upon tort, redounds to
the benefit of the employer, whose sole liability, if any, depends upon respondeat superior."l The necessary judgment
in favor of the employee was found in the judgment of dismissal with prejudice which followed the settlement, and the
resulting payment of a consideration to the employee. Under
these circumstances, the judgment was deemed equivalent to
20. 252 Cal. App.2d 208, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 389 (1967), hearing denied, 67
A.C. No.8, Minutes 3 (Oct. 6, 1967)
(Peters and Mask, n., dissenting).
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1. 252 Cal. App.2d at 212, 60 Cal,
Rptr. at 391-92.
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one for the employee on the merits, "as to which his employer
could properly take advantage."2 A concurring judge thought
that the decision was also justified by the collateral estoppel
doctrine as enunciated in the famous Bernhard3 and Teitelbaum4 cases.
Although the court failed to realize the implications of the
decision, the holding represents an unprecedented development in California law. Queriolo marks the first time in this
state that one not a party to a prior civil action has been permitted to use the judgment in that action offensively, that is,
to establish the liability to it of one who was a party.5 The
employer-employee cases relied upon by the court6 relate
to a quite different problem. They hold that when a plaintiff has sued an employee and lost, he cannot thereafter seek
recovery from the employer, whose liability is only a vicarious
one. One justification for this holding is that if the employer
lost, he would be entitled to indemnity from the employee.
Yet this would be a most anomalous result, since the employee
has already successfully defended himself in the suit brought
directly against him by the victim. Thus, the employer is
permitted to use the prior judgment defensively, that is, to
assert it as a reason why he should not be liable to one suing
him who was a party to the former suit. In Queriolo, the employer used the prior judgment in his capacity as a plaintiff,
not as a defendant. Similarly, cases like Bernhard and
Teitelbaum, which throw out mutuality as a necessary component of collateral estoppel, also concern defensive use of
a prior judgment by one not a party to the former action
against one who was a party. Three California cases pre2. 252 Cal. App.2d at 213, 60 Cal.
Rptr. at 393.
3. Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19
Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
4. Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion
Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 25 Cal. Rptr.
559, 375 P.2d 439 (1962) cert. denied
372 U.S. 966, 10 L.ed.2d 130, 83 S.Ct.
1091.

5. In Newman v. Larsen, 225 Cal.
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App.2d 22, 36 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1964),
offensive use of a prior criminal judgment was permitted. Defendant was
convicted of assault with a deadly
weapon. The victim of the assault subsequently sued civilly for damages. It
was held that defendant was estopped
to deny liability by the judgment in the
criminal proceeding.
6. See cases cited, 252 Cal. App.2d
at - , 60 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
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ceding Queriolo had expressly refused to permit offensIve use
of such a judgment. 7
Permitting offensive use of a prior judgment raises a host of
problems which are not present when defensive use is allowed.
In a case like Queriolo, where the employer and employee both
have causes of action against the defendant, they may agree
among themselves that the plaintiff who will be more attractive to a jury should be the one who sues first. The less
attractive plaintiff can then appropriate the fruits of the first
plaintiff's victory on the liability issue. He will obviously
refrain from joining as a plaintiff or intervening in the first
suit, as it will be strategically sounder to await its outcome,
taking advantage of defendant's defeat and not being barred
by his victory (never having had his own day in court). Accordingly, a multiplicity of actions will be encouraged, placing
an added burden on judicial facilities as well as on the defendant.
Other difficulties arise. The damages sought in the first
suit may have been insubstantial compared to the claim
in the second suit, so the defendant may not have litigated as
hard as he would have if a larger sum were at stake. If, as
in Queriolo, the defendant in the second suit was also the defendant in the first suit, he will not have had the opportunity
to select the forum in which the first suit was tried, and under
these circumstances it may be unfair that the second suit
should automatically be decided against him if he loses the
first. Where one plaintiff seeks recovery for property damage,
and the other asserts a personal injury claim, the defense may
be conducted by two different insurers, and it may not be just
to deprive one of the insurers of its own opportunity to litigate the liability question.
7. McDougall v. Palo Alto Unified
School District, 212 Cal. App.2d 422,
28 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1963); Price v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 164 Cal. App.2d
400, 330 P.2d 933 (1958); Nevarov
v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App.2d 762,
327 P.2d 111 (1958). Overruling
prior cases, the New York Court of
252
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Appeals has recently permitted offensive use in a case similar to Queriolo
(except that apparently the first suit was
not terminated by a settlement). B.R.
DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141,
278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 225 N.E.2d 195
(1967).
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This is not to say that it is always imprudent to permit offensive use. But surely before such use is allowed a court
must make an inquiry into fairness, which was completely absent in Queriolo. Perhaps offensive use should not be permitted if the second plaintiff knew of the first suit, could
readily have intervened, and refrained from doing so. One
fact in Queriolo which makes the decision particularly dubious
is that the first suit was settled, defendant thereupon sacrificing
his right of appeal. There is no indication in the opinion as
to how favorable a settlement the employee received. In any
event, it is possible that defendant had substantial grounds
for urging a reversal of the jury verdict on the liability issue,
which he abandoned as part of the settlement package. To
give collateral estoppel effect to such a determination of liability is a most questionable result,s and surely will have the
undesirable effect of discouraging post-verdict settlements
where another plaintiff waits in the wings to assert a claim
arising from the same transaction. 9 Moreover, the broad
mandate Queriolo gives for offensive use may well have the
effect of forcing a defendant to take an appeal, even when
he is willing to abide by the outcome of the trial as it relates
to the plaintiff whose claim has been adjudicated.
In sharp contrast to Queriolo is another recently decided
case, O'Connor v. O'Leary.lO One Dennis O'Connor, while
8. The rationale of Queriolo would
seem to apply even if the first suit
had been settled prior to trial. California cases have held that "a stipulated
judgment of dismissal in connection
with which consideration is given is
equivalent as between the parties to a
final judgment on the merits." Sylvester v. Soulsburg, 252 Cal. App.2d
at - , 60 Cal. Rptr. at 221 (1967); see
also Datta v. Staab, 173 Cal. App.2d
613,343 P.2d 977 (1959). Accordingly,
under Queriolo a second plaintiff could
presumably use such a judgment offensively to establish defendant's liability.
9. Assuming that offensive use would
be permitted of a specific judgment were
it affirmed on appeal, or if defendant
decided not to take an appeal, it does
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not always follow that such use should
be denied if the appeal is dismissed
pursuant to settlement. For example,
a defendant who had no valid basis for
taking an appeal, but who wanted to
prevent the subsequent offensive use by
another plaintiff of the determination
of liability, might file an appeal and
then dismiss it pursuant to settlement,
the victorious plaintiff being paid a sum
only nominally less than the amount of
the judgment. Such a collusive settlement should not by itself result in the
judgment's being denied offensive use.
There is no indication in Queriolo that
the settlement reached in the prior case
was not a bona fide compromise.
10. 247 Cal. App.2d 646, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1967).
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a patron at a theatre, engaged in an argument with a theatre
attendant named O'Leary, which culminated in the fatal stabbing of O'Connor by O'Leary. The latter was convicted of involuntary manslaughter after trial. O'Connor's heirs brought
a wrongful death action against O'Leary and the theatre
owner, alleging that O'Connor's death was caused by the negligence of O'Leary acting in the course of his employment.
Defendants alleged contributory negligence and assumption of
risk. Plaintiffs sought to use the judgment of conviction offensively against the defendants, alleging that the judgment
conclusively established that O'Leary's conduct in stabbing
O'Connor was negligence and a proximate cause of O'Connor's death.
The court of appeal agreed with the trial judge that such
use of the judgment should not be permitted, but not without making a careful analysis of the relevant "policy considerations.'oIl The court first noted that the judgment could
not be used against the employer, because it was not a party
to the criminal proceeding and could not be considered in
privity with its employee. Yet, in the eyes of the jury, the
employer would be prejudiced in defending the negligence
charge if the prior criminal conviction were made known.
As for the employee, the defenses of contributory negligence
and assumption of risk, which were inapplicable to the criminal proceeding, would still be available, even if he were barred
from denying his own negligence. A trial on these defenses
would require the presentation of all evidence relevant to
the negligence issue, so there would be no gain in judicial
economy from applying the collateral estoppel doctrine.
Moreover, the employee would be prejudiced in establishing
his affirmative defenses by jury knowledge of the prior conviction. The court also saw the possibility of jury confusion
as to the issues open for determination, if plaintiffs' position
were accepted.
Factors in favor of offensive use can also be identified. It
seems reasonable to assume that O'Leary, faced with criminal
11. 247 Cal. App.2d at 650, 56 Cal.
Rptr. at 4.
254
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penalties, vigorously defended the manslaughter action. He
could readily have foreseen the possibility of a civil action
by the victim's heirs. Moreover, the prosecution had proved
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas only a civil burden
of proof would have to be met in the wrongful death action.
Prejudice from jury knowledge of the criminal conviction
could be avoided by the judge simply informing the jury that
O'Leary's negligence was conceded, without making mention
of the prior proceeding. If the employer had furnished
counsel for O'Leary in the criminal case, and had otherwise
assisted in his defense, it would not be unfair to estop it, as
well as O'Leary, on the basis of the outcome of that case. 12 If
the employer would not be estopped on this ground, prejudice
to it could be eliminated by severing the case against the
employer, assuming that plaintiff was willing to finance two
trials. Nevertheless, the court's conclusion is not unsound. 13
Of greater significance, the kind of inquiry into fairness in
which it engaged-hinging upon a detailed examination of
the particular circumstances presented-is the most desirable
way of handling the problem of offensive use by a nonparty
of a prior judgment. 14
Of course, one drawback of this flexible technique is a
sacrifice in certainty; an automatic rule that offensive use will
or will not be permitted would better enable attorneys to
appraise the chances of success of litigation, and to prepare
12. Ct. Zingheim v. Marshall, 249
Cal. App.2d 736, 57 Cal. Rptr. 809
(1967) (dealing with a civil case).
13. O'Connor might well be decided
differently today. Cal. Evidence Code
§ 1300, which became effective on January 1, 1967, makes admissible evidence
of a final judgment adjudging a person
guilty of a felony, "when offered in a
civil action to prove any fact essential
to the judgment." This statute changes
the California law. See CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, Evidence Code with
Official Comments 1251 (1965). Thus,
were the O'Connor case tried after January 1, 1967, plaintiffs could have introduced the criminal judgment against
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both O'Leary and the theatre owner
as evidence (not necessarily conclusive)
that O'Leary had negligently caused
O'Connor's death. In view of the statute's making the judgment admissible
for this limited purpose, arguments
made by the court for refusing to give
the judgment collateral estoppel effect
against O'Leary would no longer have
the same validity.
14. For another illuminating example
of a commendable inquiry into the
fairness of offensive use, see Berner v.
British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines,
Inc., 346 E2d 532, 538-41 (2d Cir.
[1965]), cert. denied 382 U.S. 983, 15
L.ed.2d 472, 86 S.Ct. 559 (1966).
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for trial. Yet the price to be paid for such predictability is
too high, in view of the demonstrable advantages of a case-bycase approach. As the problem can be expected to recur with
some frequency, hopefully California courts will show the
perceptiveness of O'Connor, and not the superficiality of
Queriolo, in adjudging future claims for offensive use.
Appellate Review of Nonjury Cases

The scope of review to be accorded the determinations of
a trial judge in a nonjury case is a subject which has engendered no little confusion. The problem is particularly acute
when there is no conflict in the evidence as to what events have
occurred or what conditions have existed. In such a case, the
California decisions are in disagreement on the role of the
appellate court. One line of cases advocates free review,
reasoning that, since the facts are undisputed, only "questions
of law" are presented. 15 Another line of cases supports limited
review, on the ground that, when different conclusions can
reasonably be drawn from nonconflicting evidence, only "questions of fact" arise. 16
In Aerojet General Corporation v. D. Zelinsky & Sons,17
the court took a more promising approach to this issue. Two
employees of Zelinsky, an independent painting contractor,
were killed in an accident occurring at the plant of Aerojet,
which had employed the contractor to paint the interior of
two liquid fuel storage tanks. Wrongful death actions were
brought against Aerojet. It settled the cases after a California
Supreme Court ruling18 that liability could be imposed, on the
ground that Aerojet had employed an independent contractor
to perform hazardous work, and failed to demand or take appropriate precautions. Aerojet then sought indemnity from
Zelinsky. The indemnification proceeding was tried without
15. E.g., RKO Teleradio Pictures,
Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 246 Cal.
App.2d at 815-816, 55 Cal. Rptr. at
302 (1966), and cases there cited.
16. E.g., Lundgren v. Lundgren, 245
Cal. App.2d at 586, 54 Cal. Rptr. at
33.(1966); Cletro v. VaHey Stores, Inc.,
117 Cal. App. 2d at 711-12, 256 P.2d
256
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at 618 (1953); Industrial Indem. Co. v.
Golden State Co., 117 Cal. App.2d at
537-38, 256 P.2d at 689 (1953).
17. 249 Cal. App.2d 604, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 701 (1967).
18. Woolen v. Aerojet Gen. Corp.,
57 Cal. 2d 407, 20 Cal. Rptr. 12, 369
P.2d 708 (1962).
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a jury, the trial judge awarding relief in view of Zelinsky's
own negligence in· failing to provide its employees with a
reasonably safe place to work, and in neglecting to furnish
the necessary labor and equipment to perform the work in a
reasonably safe manner. Zelinsky appealed.
Writing for the court, Justice Leonard Friedman squarely
faced the question of the applicable standard of review:
Whether the plaintiff's role in the injury precludes
indemnity, according to many authorities, is a question
of fact for the jury or fact finder. . . . Taken literally,
that view would confine the reviewing court to an inquiry into the presence of substantial evidence to justify
the award.
Once the physical facts are clear
or established by findings, the decision for or against indemnity involves characterization of the facts rather than
truth finding. Possibly, then, the determination is one
Without
of law, or of "mixed" law and fact.
entering this thorny thicket, this appellate court believes
itself obligated to review the trial court's application of
legal standards to the facts at hand. 19
After a detailed consideration of the relative culpability of
the parties, the court affirmed the trial judge, characterizing
Aerojet's omission as "secondary and passive, while Zelinsky's
was immediate and active."20
Aerojet may represent a significant first step toward injecting order into a chaotic field of law. Refusing to hide behind the orthodox labels, the court recognized that the question
before it could not be meaningfully described as one of "law"
or one of "fact,,;1 rather, it fell into a third category of application of law to fact. Even if deference should be paid to a
trial judge's "truth finding," that is, his reconstruction of historical facts on the basis of the evidence before him, an ap19. 249 Cal. App.2d at 610, 57 Cal.
Rptr. at 705.

20. 249 Cal. App.2d at 61(1, 57 Cal.
Rptr. at 705.

1. In sharp contrast to Aerojet are
17
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cases like Pierce v. Turner, 205 Cal.
App. 2d at 268, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 118
(1962), where a judge's conclusion that
indemnity was not available was described as "one of fact," and affirmed
on that basis.
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pellate court should not pay similar deference to a trial judge's
characterization of such facts in terms of a governing legal
standard. In resolving such an issue, the trial court has no
advantage over the panel of individuals selected to comprise
the appellate court. The theory of appellate review suggests
that, under these circumstances, the collective wisdom of the
appellate judges is more likely to produce a correct result than
dependence upon the conclusion of a single trial judge.
In sharp contrast to a jury case, no constitutionally supported
policy favoring trial by jury compels respect for the determinations of the trier. If law application is granted free review, the appellate court will also be in a position to reconcile
conflicting decisions, thereby achieving the advantages of uniformity.2
The court's conclusion in Aerojet that free review should
prevail is therefore a sound one. Moreover, the perceptive
discussion of the kind of question confronting the court constitutes a major breakthrough.
2. For a fuller discussion, see Weiner,
The Civil Nonjury Trial and the Law-
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Fact Distinction, 55 CALIF. L. REv.
1020 (1967).
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